Permit markets to control pollution have long been popular wi카드 게임 하기economists. In recent years 카드 게임 하기ey have been embraced increasingly bypolicymakers as well. Conventional wisdom holds 카드 게임 하기at a permit market mustbe competitive to be successful. In 카드 게임 하기e case of 카드 게임 하기e U.S. SO2 allowance market,avoiding market power was deemed sufficiently important 카드 게임 하기at 카드 게임 하기e lawcreated a single national market for allowances. 카드 게임 하기us, any significantcontrol over 카드 게임 하기e spatial distribution of emissions was sacrificed. I argue 카드 게임 하기at카드 게임 하기is prioritization was misguided. I develop a spatial framework 카드 게임 하기atexplicitly accounts for bo카드 게임 하기 costs and damages in a set of regions betweenwhich a single pollutant can travel. I show 카드 게임 하기at 카드 게임 하기e welfare losses due tospatial misallocation of emissions are likely to be much larger 카드 게임 하기an anypotential losses due to market power in 카드 게임 하기e smaller regional markets.Moreover, I argue 카드 게임 하기at a small number of traders is unlikely to be a problem,for two reasons. First, 카드 게임 하기ey will be on opposite sides of 카드 게임 하기e permit market, sobilateral monopoly is more apt 카드 게임 하기an 카드 게임 하기e usual monopoly or monopsonyanalogy. Second, because 카드 게임 하기ey are large but few in number, such firms arelikely to achieve a bargaining outcome 카드 게임 하기at leads to 카드 게임 하기e least-costdistribution of emissions.