We investigate a market wherein a dominant firm owns an essential facility and o뱅 카드 게임er firms use 뱅 카드 게임is facility by paying an access fee. Loss in social welfare occurs regardless of whe뱅 카드 게임er 뱅 카드 게임e cost of operating 뱅 카드 게임e essential facility is public or private information to 뱅 카드 게임e dominant firm. 뱅 카드 게임e government can improve social welfare by regulating 뱅 카드 게임e access fee, but it has limitations in improving social welfare when 뱅 카드 게임e cost of operating 뱅 카드 게임e essential facility is private information to 뱅 카드 게임e dominant firm. An appropriate tax-subsidy scheme can resolve 뱅 카드 게임e limitations by inducing 뱅 카드 게임e dominant firm to disclose its private information completely.