We examine 카드 게임 optimal liability rule in accidents involving fully autonomous vehicles. In cases where enforcing due activity is not feasible, it is socially optimal to apply 카드 게임 strict liability rule to 카드 게임 human operator determining 카드 게임 activity level and to apply 카드 게임 negligence rule to 카드 게임 manufacturer and 카드 게임 victim who select care levels under contributory or comparative negligence in 카드 게임 unilateral activity case. Under 카드 게임 joint and several liability rule, both 카드 게임 manufacturer and 카드 게임 victim exercise due care, contingent on regulating 카드 게임 manufacturer’s liability share sufficiently high, and 카드 게임 human operator assuming 카드 게임 remaining risks chooses 카드 게임 socially optimal activity level maximizing 카드 게임 social net benefit. Conversely, if due activity enforcement is possible, an alternative liability rule proves optimal. Under this rule, 카드 게임 human operator engages in efficient activity to comply with 카드 게임 activity standard, 카드 게임 manufacturer exercises efficient care to meet 카드 게임 care standard, and 카드 게임 victim assumes residual liability so as to be induced to take efficient care. Notably, this liability rule achieves 카드 게임 social optimum, even in bilateral activity cases where both 카드 게임 human operator and 카드 게임 victim engage in activity. Our results diverge from previous findings suggesting that achieving 카드 게임 social optimum involves using public sanctions, such as paying a fine to 카드 게임 state.