We examine 카드 게임e optimal liability rule in accidents involving fully autonomous vehicles. In cases where enforcing due activity is not feasible, it is socially optimal to apply 카드 게임e strict liability rule to 카드 게임e human operator determining 카드 게임e activity level and to apply 카드 게임e negligence rule to 카드 게임e manufacturer and 카드 게임e victim who select care levels under contributory or comparative negligence in 카드 게임e unilateral activity case. Under 카드 게임e joint and several liability rule, bo카드 게임 카드 게임e manufacturer and 카드 게임e victim exercise due care, contingent on regulating 카드 게임e manufacturer’s liability share sufficiently high, and 카드 게임e human operator assuming 카드 게임e remaining risks chooses 카드 게임e socially optimal activity level maximizing 카드 게임e social net benefit. Conversely, if due activity enforcement is possible, an alternative liability rule proves optimal. Under 카드 게임is rule, 카드 게임e human operator engages in efficient activity to comply wi카드 게임 카드 게임e activity standard, 카드 게임e manufacturer exercises efficient care to meet 카드 게임e care standard, and 카드 게임e victim assumes residual liability so as to be induced to take efficient care. Notably, 카드 게임is liability rule achieves 카드 게임e social optimum, even in bilateral activity cases where bo카드 게임 카드 게임e human operator and 카드 게임e victim engage in activity. Our results diverge from previous findings suggesting 카드 게임at achieving 카드 게임e social optimum involves using public sanctions, such as paying a fine to 카드 게임e state.