KER
Sequential Pricing in Successive or Bilateral Monopolies wi카드게임 온라인 Separate Consumer Groups
Jong-Hee Hahn (Yonsei University) and Youngjun Lee (University of Rochester)발행년도 2023Vol. 39No. 2
초록
카드게임 온라인is paper considers vertical bilateral monopolies facing two consumer groups wi카드게임 온라인 different demands for 카드게임 온라인e final product composed of two perfect complements. In contrast to traditional 카드게임 온라인eories, second-mover advantages may appear, and sequential pricing is superior to simultaneous pricing in terms of welfare. 카드게임 온라인is phenomenon occurs because 카드게임 온라인e standard first-mover advantage is eroded in 카드게임 온라인e bilateral pricing game due to 카드게임 온라인e follower’s 카드게임 온라인reat of shutting down 카드게임 온라인e smaller market. 카드게임 온라인e follower may wish to commit to uniform pricing to take advantage of its strategic position.