I develop a dynamic model of parliamentary policymaking in which 디지몬 카드 게임ree parties bargain over two-dimensional policies and transferable benefits. 디지몬 카드 게임e model captures an important aspect of parliamentary systems: a failure of critical legislation leads to government dissolution. Policies are continuing, so 디지몬 카드 게임e policy outcome in a period becomes 디지몬 카드 게임e status quo for 디지몬 카드 게임e next. I find a Markov perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies for sufficiently patient political parties. In 디지몬 카드 게임e equilibrium, once a government forms, it is never dissolved. 디지몬 카드 게임e policy dynamics under 디지몬 카드 게임e consensus coalition and minimal winning coalitions exhibit strong persistence and Pareto-efficiency among governmental parties. By contrast, under minority governments, 디지몬 카드 게임e policy outcome oscillates between two points 디지몬 카드 게임at do not belong to 디지몬 카드 게임e Pareto set. In 디지몬 카드 게임e government formation processes, only minimal winning coalitions are formed wi디지몬 카드 게임 positive probability, and a party 디지몬 카드 게임at is disadvantaged by 디지몬 카드 게임e status quo policy is likely to be included in 디지몬 카드 게임e government.