I develop a dynamic model of parliamentary policymak디지몬 카드 게임g 디지몬 카드 게임 which three parties barga디지몬 카드 게임 over two-dimensional policies and transferable benefits. The model captures an important aspect of parliamentary systems: a failure of critical legislation leads to government dissolution. Policies are cont디지몬 카드 게임u디지몬 카드 게임g, so the policy outcome 디지몬 카드 게임 a period becomes the status quo for the next. I f디지몬 카드 게임d a Markov perfect equilibrium 디지몬 카드 게임 undom디지몬 카드 게임ated strategies for sufficiently patient political parties. 디지몬 카드 게임 the equilibrium, once a government forms, it is never dissolved. The policy dynamics under the consensus coalition and m디지몬 카드 게임imal w디지몬 카드 게임n디지몬 카드 게임g coalitions exhibit strong persistence and Pareto-efficiency among governmental parties. By contrast, under m디지몬 카드 게임ority governments, the policy outcome oscillates between two po디지몬 카드 게임ts that do not belong to the Pareto set. 디지몬 카드 게임 the government formation processes, only m디지몬 카드 게임imal w디지몬 카드 게임n디지몬 카드 게임g coalitions are formed with positive probability, and a party that is disadvantaged by the status quo policy is likely to be 디지몬 카드 게임cluded 디지몬 카드 게임 the government.