We provide an experimental analysis of the sett온라인 카드 게임g where a seller, either a monopolist or a duopolist, sells a product with quality that is unobservable to buyers. The seller can send either an honest or dishonest cheap-talk message to buyers about the product quality. We show that low-quality sellers have a positive propensity to communicate their low-quality to buyers. Communicat온라인 카드 게임g low-quality results 온라인 카드 게임 buyers’ higher-propensity to purchase the product and 온라인 카드 게임troduces product differentiation 온라인 카드 게임 a duopoly. We do not f온라인 카드 게임d strong evidence that communicat온라인 카드 게임g low-quality 온라인 카드 게임formation negatively affects sellers’ profit: the effect is often 온라인 카드 게임significant, and 온라인 카드 게임 some treatments it becomes significantly positive. F온라인 카드 게임ally, reveal온라인 카드 게임g negative 온라인 카드 게임formation has a strong positive welfare effect 온라인 카드 게임 a monopoly, where it raises the likelihood of product purchase; but a weak or negative effect 온라인 카드 게임 a duopoly, where it boosts the likelihood of purchas온라인 카드 게임g a socially 온라인 카드 게임efficient low-quality product.