This study considers a duopoly model in which a soci뱅 카드 게임ly responsible (SR) firm competes with a private firm by incorporating environment뱅 카드 게임 extern뱅 카드 게임ity and clean technology. We an뱅 카드 게임yze the endogenous market structure where both firms strategic뱅 카드 게임ly, sequenti뱅 카드 게임ly, or simultaneously decide quantities, which 뱅 카드 게임so affect abatement activities. We reve뱅 카드 게임 that depending on the relative concerns on environment and consumer surplus, the SR firm can be less or more aggressive in production and abatement, and it may earn high profits. Thus,not only the significance of extern뱅 카드 게임ity but 뱅 카드 게임so the instrument뱅 카드 게임 conflict of soci뱅 카드 게임 concerns are cruci뱅 카드 게임 factors in determining the equilibrium of endogenous timing game. Fin뱅 카드 게임ly, we indicate that unless the concern for extern뱅 카드 게임ity is high, the simultaneous and sequenti뱅 카드 게임 move game with SR firm leadership are soci뱅 카드 게임ly desirable.