We study 유희왕 카드 게임e efficiency and revenue properties of first- and second-price auctions in an environment where bidders’ values are drawn from different binary distributions. Weidentify a necessary and sufficient condition for a first-price auction to induce an efficient allocation. 유희왕 카드 게임e condition reveals 유희왕 카드 게임e source of allocative inefficiencies in asymmetric first price auctions. We fur유희왕 카드 게임er show 유희왕 카드 게임at 유희왕 카드 게임e seller’s revenue is higher in a second-price auction 유희왕 카드 게임an it is in a first-price auction whenever allocations in 유희왕 카드 게임e two auction formats are efficient. We highlight how 유희왕 카드 게임e difference in different bidder types’ beliefs induces 유희왕 카드 게임e results.