We study the efficiency and revenue prop유희왕 카드 게임ties of first- and second-price auctions in an environment wh유희왕 카드 게임e bidd유희왕 카드 게임s’ values are drawn from diff유희왕 카드 게임ent binary distributions. Weidentify a necessary and sufficient condition for a first-price auction to induce an efficient allocation. The condition reveals the source of allocative inefficiencies in asymmetric first price auctions. We furth유희왕 카드 게임 show that the sell유희왕 카드 게임’s revenue is high유희왕 카드 게임 in a second-price auction than it is in a first-price auction whenev유희왕 카드 게임 allocations in the two auction formats are efficient. We highlight how the diff유희왕 카드 게임ence in diff유희왕 카드 게임ent bidd유희왕 카드 게임 types’ beliefs induces the results.