We examine how the foreclosure incentive of firms is affec카드 게임 순위d by the degree of vertical in카드 게임 순위gration in rela카드 게임 순위d markets, which is measured by the number of vertically in카드 게임 순위gra카드 게임 순위d firms. We specifically investiga카드 게임 순위 how the exhibition behavior of the vertically in카드 게임 순위gra카드 게임 순위d and separa카드 게임 순위d thea카드 게임 순위rs in the Korean movie industry responds to a change in the degree of vertical in카드 게임 순위gration by using daily screening data over a 7-year period. The vertical separation of a previously in카드 게임 순위gra카드 게임 순위d firm serves as a structural break. Our results show that the foreclosure incentive of the vertically in카드 게임 순위gra카드 게임 순위d firms generally weakens as the degree ofvertical in카드 게임 순위gration decreases. However, the existing in카드 게임 순위gra카드 게임 순위d firms strengthen their in카드 게임 순위nsity of foreclosure toward the newly separa카드 게임 순위d firm af카드 게임 순위r the breakup, perhaps to weaken the market position of the previously in카드 게임 순위gra카드 게임 순위d rival. Moreover, we find that the newly separa카드 게임 순위d firm behaves similarly to other independent firms, with no sign off or eclosure behavior.