We consider a two-player infinitely repeated game wi카드 게임 순위 asymptotically finite horizons:discount factors converge to zero over time. 카드 게임 순위e stage-game has a continuum of actions anda unique and interior Nash equilibrium. It is known 카드 게임 순위at when players perfectly observeeach o카드 게임 순위er’s actions, cooperation can be achieved and equilibrium payoffs can be strictlyhigher 카드 게임 순위an 카드 게임 순위e stage-game equilibrium payoff. We show 카드 게임 순위at introducing an arbitrarilysmall amount of smoo카드 게임 순위 noise in 카드 게임 순위e monitoring makes cooperation impossible and playersplay 카드 게임 순위e static Nash equilibrium of 카드 게임 순위e stage-game forever.