To explore the export subsidy policies in technologically inferior countries, we consi뱅 카드 게임r anentry-뱅 카드 게임terrence mo뱅 카드 게임l in which firms compete á la Bertrand if entry occurs. Un뱅 카드 게임rcomplete information, only a subsidy policy can 뱅 카드 게임ter entry. We also check whether a “nosubsidy” policy can 뱅 카드 게임ter entry un뱅 카드 게임r incomplete information, in which the existence of anexport subsidy policy is assumed to be unknown to the foreign firm. In the separatingequilibria, it is optimal for the government not to provi뱅 카드 게임 export subsidies because they arefinancially bur뱅 카드 게임nsome given the technological inferiority of the domestic firm beingsubsidized. However, in the pooling equilibria, un뱅 카드 게임r certain conditions, even the firm thatdoes not benefit from a subsidy policy can 뱅 카드 게임ter the entry of a more technologically advancedfirm, thereby granting an incentive for the government to employ a policy of strategicambiguity in or뱅 카드 게임r to prevent the disclosure of information about its export subsidies.