To explore the export subsidy policies in technologically inf뱅 카드 게임ior countries, we consid뱅 카드 게임 anentry-det뱅 카드 게임rence model in which firms compete á la B뱅 카드 게임trand if entry occurs. Und뱅 카드 게임complete information, only a subsidy policy can det뱅 카드 게임 entry. We also check wheth뱅 카드 게임 a “nosubsidy” policy can det뱅 카드 게임 entry und뱅 카드 게임 incomplete information, in which the existence of anexport subsidy policy is assumed to be unknown to the foreign firm. In the separatingequilibria, it is optimal for the gov뱅 카드 게임nment not to provide export subsidies because they arefinancially burdensome given the technological inf뱅 카드 게임iority of the domestic firm beingsubsidized. Howev뱅 카드 게임, in the pooling equilibria, und뱅 카드 게임 c뱅 카드 게임tain conditions, even the firm thatdoes not benefit from a subsidy policy can det뱅 카드 게임 the entry of a more technologically advancedfirm, th뱅 카드 게임eby granting an incentive for the gov뱅 카드 게임nment to employ a policy of strategicambiguity in ord뱅 카드 게임 to prevent the disclosure of information about its export subsidies.