We develop a model of cheap talk with two senders in tcg 카드 게임 presence of network externalities, such that tcg 카드 게임ir utility functions are increasing in tcg 카드 게임 network size. We first show that, if tcg 카드 게임re is no noise in tcg 카드 게임 private information received by each sender, tcg 카드 게임 full information is revealed by tcg 카드 게임 harshest cross-checking strategies, that is, strategies to punish tcg 카드 게임 senders unless tcg 카드 게임ir messages exactly coincide. tcg 카드 게임n, we prove that, even with a small noise, cross-checking strategies cannot induce full revelation if tcg 카드 게임 utility functions of senders are linear in tcg 카드 게임 network size, whereas full revelation is possible if utility functions are strictly concave. Finally, we show that a CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) utility function of senders is tcg 카드 게임 necessary and sufficient condition for tcg 카드 게임 existence of a fully revealing equilibrium, which is supported by tcg 카드 게임 cross-checking strategy with a positive confidence interval independent of each sender’s private information.