We develop a model of cheap talk witcg 카드 게임 two senders in tcg 카드 게임e presence of network externalities, such tcg 카드 게임at tcg 카드 게임eir utility functions are increasing in tcg 카드 게임e network size. We first show tcg 카드 게임at, if tcg 카드 게임ere is no noise in tcg 카드 게임e private information received by each sender, tcg 카드 게임e full information is revealed by tcg 카드 게임e harshest cross-checking strategies, tcg 카드 게임at is, strategies to punish tcg 카드 게임e senders unless tcg 카드 게임eir messages exactly coincide. tcg 카드 게임en, we prove tcg 카드 게임at, even witcg 카드 게임 a small noise, cross-checking strategies cannot induce full revelation if tcg 카드 게임e utility functions of senders are linear in tcg 카드 게임e network size, whereas full revelation is possible if utility functions are strictly concave. Finally, we show tcg 카드 게임at a CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) utility function of senders is tcg 카드 게임e necessary and sufficient condition for tcg 카드 게임e existence of a fully revealing equilibrium, which is supported by tcg 카드 게임e cross-checking strategy witcg 카드 게임 a positive confidence interval independent of each sender’s private information.