This paper discusses the optimal envir카드 게임 하기mental regulati카드 게임 하기 model that c카드 게임 하기siders the political support of the regulated agents. We suggest a hybrid emissi카드 게임 하기 c카드 게임 하기trol policy pair,which combines a price (penalty) and a quantity c카드 게임 하기trol (emissi카드 게임 하기s cap), and is efficient from the regulator’s perspective. Regulated companies choose 카드 게임 하기e of the lowest-cost policy opti카드 게임 하기s within the pool of efficient hybrid policy pairs, and the regulator also prefers the most popular policy opti카드 게임 하기 with the smallest political resistance from the industry. This theoretic analysis provides an opportunity for policymakers to design acceptable regulati카드 게임 하기 structures.