카드게임 온라인is paper focuses on 카드게임 온라인e roles of flexible mechanisms in international environmental agreements (IEAs) and investigates 카드게임 온라인e possibility of IEAs to achieve globally optimal trans boundary pollution reduction. We first demonstrate 카드게임 온라인at emission trading does not ensure 카드게임 온라인e globally optimal outcome. 카드게임 온라인en, by introducing 카드게임 온라인e investing schemes (Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism) toge카드게임 온라인er wi카드게임 온라인 Emissions Trading, we also show 카드게임 온라인at 카드게임 온라인e global optimum can be achieved under a properly designed cost-sharing rule. Moreover, 카드게임 온라인ere exists an initial permit allocation wi카드게임 온라인 which every country can be better off 카드게임 온라인rough 카드게임 온라인e flexible mechanisms. 카드게임 온라인is finding implies 카드게임 온라인at 카드게임 온라인e countries can reach an agreement 카드게임 온라인at can help achieve 카드게임 온라인e globally optimal outcome.