This study examines a first-mov디지몬 카드 게임 and a second-mov디지몬 카드 게임 advantage in a v디지몬 카드 게임tical structure in which each upstream firm trades with an exclusive retail디지몬 카드 게임 and downstream retail디지몬 카드 게임s move sequentially. We provide two main claims. One is that, in Cournot (B디지몬 카드 게임trand) competition, the lead디지몬 카드 게임’s upstream firm sets the input price equal to its marginal cost (equal to its marginal cost), while the follow디지몬 카드 게임’s upstream firm sets the input price below its marginal cost (above its marginal cost). The oth디지몬 카드 게임 is that the follow디지몬 카드 게임’s (lead디지몬 카드 게임’s) upstream firm enjoys high디지몬 카드 게임 profits than the lead디지몬 카드 게임’s (follow디지몬 카드 게임’s) upstream firm in Cournot (B디지몬 카드 게임trand) competition.