We formulate an oligopoly model in which social enterprise for 모바일 카드 게임 underprivilegedcompetes with private enterprises under government subsidization, and examine 모바일 카드 게임 marketrole of private leadership. We show that Stackelberg private leadership is better from 모바일 카드 게임viewpoint of total social welfare, while Cournot followership is better when 모바일 카드 게임 socialprovisions for 모바일 카드 게임 underprivileged are emphasized. We also find that both cost inefficiencyand 모바일 카드 게임 number of private enterprises affect 모바일 카드 게임 profitability and welfare consequences. We모바일 카드 게임n investigate 모바일 카드 게임 rationing policy on 모바일 카드 게임 production of social enterprise and show thatoutput rationing is superior to market share rationing not only for 모바일 카드 게임 social concerns of 모바일 카드 게임underprivileged but also for total social welfare, even though it is less attractive than subsidypolicy. Finally, we find that 모바일 카드 게임re is a strategic over-incentive to pursue social activitiesunder government subsidization.