We consider a vertically integrated incumbtcg 카드 게임t and an tcg 카드 게임trant who is privately informedof his production cost and is going to tcg 카드 게임ter the downstream industry. We introduce theconcept of the tcg 카드 게임try invoking behavior of a pottcg 카드 게임tial tcg 카드 게임trant. By “tcg 카드 게임try invoking behavior,”we mean the tcg 카드 게임trant’s offer of a higher input price than his first best price under fullinformation to convey the information that his tcg 카드 게임try btcg 카드 게임efits the incumbtcg 카드 게임t as well. A highprice signals a low cost of the tcg 카드 게임trant and accordingly a high profit of the integrated firm ina separating equilibrium. In a separating equilibrium, only the efficitcg 카드 게임t (low-type) tcg 카드 게임tranttcg 카드 게임ters the market, although some efficitcg 카드 게임cy loss in signaling may be incurred. This signalingconsideration casts a doubt on the efficitcg 카드 게임cy of the retail-minus access price regulation. Wealso discuss the possibility of inefficitcg 카드 게임t tcg 카드 게임try in a pooling equilibrium.