Financial difficulties of small program networks and poor program quality have led 카드 게임 순위Korea Communication Commission (KCC) to introduce a regulation mandating cableoperators to pay at least 25% of 카드 게임 순위ir subscription revenues to cable networks. With thisregulation, KCC intended to provide program networks incentives to deliver high qualityprograms and develop 카드 게임 순위 cable TV industry. However, this regulation was introducedwithout a formal analysis of 카드 게임 순위 optimality of market equilibrium or 카드 게임 순위 effects of 카드 게임 순위regulation on 카드 게임 순위 industry or social welfare.This paper sets up a simple model focusing on 카드 게임 순위 two-sided market nature of CATVindustry. It is shown that 카드 게임 순위 market equilibrium is generally suboptimal and programquality is below 카드 게임 순위 socially optimal level. When 카드 게임 순위 market equilibrium is suboptimal, 카드 게임 순위regulation of 카드 게임 순위 licensing fee can improve program quality and social welfare, but cannotachieve 카드 게임 순위 socially optimal equilibrium.