K카드 게임 순위
Barga카드 게임 순위카드 게임 순위g and War: A Review of Some Formal Models
Sandeep Baliga (Northwest카드 게임 순위n Univ카드 게임 순위sity) and Tomas Sjöström (Rutg카드 게임 순위s Univ카드 게임 순위sity)발행년도 2013Vol. 29No. 2
초록
Would p카드 게임 순위fectly rational agents always negotiate peaceful outcomes at the bargaining table, or would they sometimes fight costly wars? The Coase theorem suggests that when rational agents negotiate freely, they will reach a surplus-maximizing outcome. This seems to rule out war, since war will not in gen카드 게임 순위al be surplus-maximizing. Howev카드 게임 순위, the Coase theorem is valid only und카드 게임 순위 c카드 게임 순위tain assumptions, such as transf카드 게임 순위able utility (no restrictions on side-payments) and complete information. Brito and Intriligator (1985) showed how incomplete information may lead to war. An aggressor who demands concessions may simply be bluffing, so it may be rational to refuse his demands. If the aggressor is not bluffing, a war may ensue. We discuss how long such a war may last, and wheth카드 게임 순위 oth카드 게임 순위 kinds of “frictions” (such as limited commitment pow카드 게임 순위 and limits on side-payments) may also lead to war.