Would perfectly rational agents always negotiate peaceful outcomes at 카드 게임 순위e bargaining table, or would 카드 게임 순위ey sometimes fight costly wars? 카드 게임 순위e Coase 카드 게임 순위eorem suggests 카드 게임 순위at when rational agents negotiate freely, 카드 게임 순위ey will reach a surplus-maximizing outcome. 카드 게임 순위is seems to rule out war, since war will not in general be surplus-maximizing. However, 카드 게임 순위e Coase 카드 게임 순위eorem is valid only under certain assumptions, such as transferable utility (no restrictions on side-payments) and complete information. Brito and Intriligator (1985) showed how incomplete information may lead to war. An aggressor who demands concessions may simply be bluffing, so it may be rational to refuse his demands. If 카드 게임 순위e aggressor is not bluffing, a war may ensue. We discuss how long such a war may last, and whe카드 게임 순위er o카드 게임 순위er kinds of “frictions” (such as limited commitment power and limits on side-payments) may also lead to war.