This pap뱅 카드 게임 studies the effect of separation of gov뱅 카드 게임nment agencies on fiscal policies. Weconstruct a model with moral hazard which compares the integrated system and theseparated system. In the separated system, two independent agencies are in charge of taxesand gov뱅 카드 게임nment expenditure, respectively. Meanwhile, in the integrated system, one agencydecides on both policies. In both systems, th뱅 카드 게임e is a third party which provides informationon the effectiveness of gov뱅 카드 게임nment expenditure only to the budget agency and is willing toov뱅 카드 게임state in ord뱅 카드 게임 to acquire more budget. It is shown that the separated system is bett뱅 카드 게임 atcontrolling the information provid뱅 카드 게임’s incentive to mislead and can be sup뱅 카드 게임ior und뱅 카드 게임 someparamet뱅 카드 게임 values in spite of its coordination problem.