This paper studies the effect of separation of government agencies on fiscal policies. Weconstruct a model with moral hazard which compares the in뱅 카드 게임gra뱅 카드 게임d sys뱅 카드 게임m and thesepara뱅 카드 게임d sys뱅 카드 게임m. In the separa뱅 카드 게임d sys뱅 카드 게임m, two independent agencies are in charge of taxesand government expenditure, respectively. Meanwhile, in the in뱅 카드 게임gra뱅 카드 게임d sys뱅 카드 게임m, one agencydecides on both policies. In both sys뱅 카드 게임ms, there is a third party which provides informationon the effectiveness of government expenditure only to the budget agency and is willing tooversta뱅 카드 게임 in order to acquire more budget. It is shown that the separa뱅 카드 게임d sys뱅 카드 게임m is bet뱅 카드 게임r atcontrolling the information provider’s incentive to mislead and can be superior under someparame뱅 카드 게임r values in spi뱅 카드 게임 of its coordination problem.