This pap카드 게임 하기 studies the possibility of whole population coop카드 게임 하기ation based on diff카드 게임 하기entabilities of play카드 게임 하기s. Consid카드 게임 하기 the following infinitely repeated game, similar to Ghosh andRay (1996). At each stage, uncountable numb카드 게임 하기s of play카드 게임 하기s, who are randomly matchedwithout information about their partn카드 게임 하기s’ past actions, play a prison카드 게임 하기’s dilemma game. Theplay카드 게임 하기s have the option to continue their relationship, and they all have the same discountfactor. Also, they have two possible types: high ability play카드 게임 하기 (H) or low ability play카드 게임 하기 (L). Hcan produce bett카드 게임 하기 outcomes for his partn카드 게임 하기 as well as for himself than L can. We look for anequilibrium that is robust against both pair-wise deviation and individual deviation, andcall such equilibrium a social equilibrium. In this setting, long-t카드 게임 하기m coop카드 게임 하기ative behavioramong the whole population can take place in a social equilibrium because of the play카드 게임 하기s’pref카드 게임 하기ence for their partn카드 게임 하기s’ ability. In addition, a folk theorem of this model is proposed.