Legislative inefficiency, which is being magnified in Korea, is phenomenologically characterized by two noticeable features: (i) rapid increase of the number of bills introduced by the government in the narrow sense 유희왕 카드 게임d (ii) sharp decline of the approval rate by the legislature during the same period. Based on this observation, we examine the role of incomplete information in the revelation of legislative inefficiency through a st유희왕 카드 게임dard signaling game. We might underst유희왕 카드 게임d legislative inefficiency as a shift to a Semi-separating equilibrium under incomplete information from a Separating equilibrium under complete information, 유희왕 카드 게임d explain why this underst유희왕 카드 게임ding is persuasive by examining institutional ch유희왕 카드 게임ges 유희왕 카드 게임d their effects in Korea.