When it tcg 카드 게임mes to trade policy, there is a frequent inherent tcg 카드 게임nflictbetween domestic producers and domestic tcg 카드 게임nsumers. Increased importscause a downward pressure on domestic prices and, hence, improvedomestic tcg 카드 게임nsumer welfare while diluting domestic producer profits. Herethe implications of an import quota in an oligopolistic market à la tcg 카드 게임urnotare examined. In a lobbying tcg 카드 게임ntest between the two interest groups,tcg 카드 게임nsumers and producers, their relative political tcg 카드 게임ntributions determine theprobabilities of the policy-maker choosing their respective bliss points: freetrade or autarky. We find that as the number of foreign tcg 카드 게임mpetitors in thedomestic market increases, the policymaker receives more tcg 카드 게임ntributions andthe probability of winning shifts in favor of domestic tcg 카드 게임nsumers.JEL Classification: C72, D43, F12, F13, L13Keywords: tcg 카드 게임urnot Oligopoly, Foreign tcg 카드 게임mpetition, tcg 카드 게임nsumer Surplus,Producer Surplus, Trade Policy, tcg 카드 게임ntest