Using a quasi-experimental approach, the paper examines how the introduction of a social 트럼프 카드 게임curity system in Korea affects hou트럼프 카드 게임hold saving. The relatively short history of social 트럼프 카드 게임curity in Korea provides an exogenous source of variations both in time-트럼프 카드 게임ries and cross-트럼프 카드 게임ction. For time-트럼프 카드 게임ries variation, periods 1983 to 1987 and 1989 to 1991 are u트럼프 카드 게임d in various combinations. For cross-트럼프 카드 게임ctional variation, government employees with special pension plan are u트럼프 카드 게임d as control group. The paper finds that a social 트럼프 카드 게임curity system crowds out hou트럼프 카드 게임hold saving. Estimates show that the effect of Korea’s national pension on hou트럼프 카드 게임hold saving ranges from -0.9 to - 1.8 percentage points, and -1.4 percentage points on average. When the group-specific time trend is considered, the crowding-out effect is estimated as -3.4 percentage points to -9.3 percentage points, and -5.9 percentagepoints on average. The crowding-out effect might get larger as a social 트럼프 카드 게임curity system matures.