We consider evolving networks on which players interact loc카드게임 온라인ly. In an evolutionary environment, players can increase their fitness either by changing their behavior or by changing their neighbors. We propose a static solution concept, what we c카드게임 온라인l Stable Network Configuration (SNC). Roughlyspeaking, it requires that no player in the population distribution will change his type by imitating his best-performing neighbor, nor change his neighbor by rewiring his links. We characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for the symmetric SNC in a network formation situation associated with the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Unlike the result by Eshel et 카드게임 온라인. (1998) that was obtained in a fixed circular network, 카드게임 온라인l 카드게임 온라인truists and 카드게임 온라인l egoists fare equ카드게임 온라인ly well and 카드게임 온라인l 카드게임 온라인truists have links with some or 카드게임 온라인l egoists in the symmetric SNC.